The literature on "mechanism design from samples," which has flourished in recent years at the interface of economics and computer science, offers a bridge between the classic computerscience approach of worst-case analysis (corresponding to "no samples") and the classic economic approach of average-case analysis for a given Bayesian prior (conceptually corresponding to the number of samples tending to infinity). Nonetheless, the two directions studied so far are two extreme and almost diametrically opposed directions: that of asymptotic results where the number of samples grows large, and that where only a single sample is available. In this paper, we take a first step toward understanding the middle ground that bridges these two approaches: that of a fixed number of samples greater than one. In a variety of contexts, we ask what is possibly the most fundamental question in this direction: are two samples really better than one sample?. We present a few surprising negative results, and complement them with our main result: showing that the worst-case, over all regular distributions, expected-revenue guarantee of the Empirical Revenue Maximization algorithm given two samples is greater than that of this algorithm given one sample. The proof is technically challenging, and provides the first result that shows that some deterministic mechanism constructed using two samples can guarantee more than one half of the optimal revenue.
Introduction
Arguably the simplest revenue maximization problem is that of maximizing the revenue of a single buyer from selling a single item to a single bidder. In this problem, the seller customarily possesses some prior information about the buyer, traditionally modeled via a distribution from which the valuation (maximum willingness to pay for the item) of the buyer is drawn, and the seller's task in this Bayesian model is to devise a selling mechanism that maximizes her expected revenue over this distribution. This classic problem was completely resolved in the seminal paper of Myerson (1981) , who showed that the optimal mechanism (among all truthful, possibly even randomized, mechanisms) is to offer the item for a take-it-or-leave-it price tailored for the given prior distribution.
In recent years, the literature at the interface of economics and computer science, influenced by the newly found popularity of machine learning, has seen the rise of a line of work that relaxes the assumption of complete knowledge of the underlying distribution by the seller, to the assumption of the seller having access to samples from this distribution. In a sense, this model offers a bridge, via the number of samples that are available to the seller, between the classic computer-science approach of worst-case analysis (corresponding to "no samples") and the above-mentioned classic economic approach of average-case analysis for a given prior distribution (conceptually corresponding to the number of samples tending to infinity). Nonetheless, all of the results that we know of in this vein are in one of two extreme and almost diametrically opposed directions: one looking at asymptotic results where the number of samples grows large (Cole and Roughgarden, 2014; Roughgarden, 2015, 2016; Devanur et al., 2016; Roughgarden and Schrijvers, 2016; Gonczarowski and Nisan, 2017; Balcan et al., 2016; Alon et al., 2017; Balcan et al., 2018) , and the other asking what can be done with a single sample (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015; Huang et al., 2015; Fu et al., 2015) . For example, a result of the former direction would tell us that under certain conditions, a number of samples that is polynomial in certain parameters of the problem suffices for attaining a certain approximation to the optimal revenue with high probability, while a result of the latter direction would tell us that under certain conditions, access to a single sample from the buyer's distribution allows the seller to design a mechanism that attains some constant fraction of the optimal revenue in expectation. In this paper, we take a first step towards understanding the middle ground that bridges these two approaches: that of a fixed number of samples greater than one. In particular, we ask what is possibly the most fundamental question in this direction: are two samples really better than one sample?
To understand the specific context in which we ask the above question, and why it is more involved than may be expected, we zoom-in to provide some more context. Arguably the most natural algorithm for pricing a good given samples from an underlying distribution is the Empirical Revenue Maximization (henceforth ERM) algorithm, which sets the price to be the one that would maximize the expected revenue over the empirical distribution -the uniform distribution over the given samples. For a single sample, this means offering the good for a price that equals this sample, which is shown by Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) to guarantee a revenue of one half (!) of the optimal revenue when the underlying distribution is regular 1 . 2 Huang et al. (2015) have in fact shown that this guarantee of one half cannot be improved upon by any deterministic mechanism that is designed based on a single sample from a regular distribution. 3 As the number of samples grows large, Huang et al. (2015) show that ERM attains revenue that asymptotically tends to optimal for regular distributions. The main question that we ask in this paper is whether, for regular distributions, the worst-case guarantee of ERM constructed based on two samples is better, the same, or worse, then the one-half worst-case guarantee of ERM constructed based on one sample.
While it is clear that the optimal method to price an item based on two samples guarantees at least as much revenue as the optimal method to price an item based on a single sample -indeed, one could always ignore the second sample and only use the first sample as in the single-sample case -it is far less clear that ERM when based on two samples should have a better worstcase guarantee than ERM when based on a single sample. 4 To drive this point home, we present two seemingly-similar problems, for which we show that increasing the number of samples has an undesired effect on the revenue of ERM, and an additional problem where another natural notion of monotonicity fails to hold for ERM. To phrase these three problems, it will be convenient to use the following notation: given a distribution F and a natural number n, we denote by ERM (F, n) the expected revenue over F when pricing an item according to ERM given n samples from the (underlying) distribution F .
Problem 1: Is it true that for any fixed underlying regular distribution F and any number n, it holds that ERM (F, n + 1) ≥ ERM (F, n)? The answer, even for n = 1, turns out to be No! In fact, it turns out that for certain distributions F , taking more samples "confuses" ERM, hurting revenue: ERM (F, 2) < ERM (F, 1).
Problem 2: Is it true that for any two fixed regular distributions F and G, if
The answer, even for n = 1, turns out to be No! In fact, it turns out that for certain distributions F and G, while ERM (F, 1) > ERM (G, 1), it is in fact the case that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2).
Problem 3: Is it true that for any two fixed regular distributions F and G such that F first-order stochastically dominates G, and for any number n, it holds that ERM (F, n) ≥ ERM (G, n)? While for n = 1 this is known to hold, the answer, already for n = 2, turns out to be No! In fact, it turns out that for certain such distributions F and G, while the revenue from each fixed posted price is higher from F than it is from G, the structure of F "confuses" ERM when based on two samples, hurting revenue by causing ERM to post lower-revenue prices.
The analyses of the above three problems are given in Section 3. Despite the surprising negative answers surveyed above to all three problems, we do manage to show monotonicity in the sense that the worst-case guarantee of the price computed by ERM based on two samples from a regular distribution is strictly higher than one half of the optimal expected revenue obtained by setting a posted price tailored specifically to the underlying distribution. To formalize this result, which is our main result, it will be convenient to use the following notation: given a distribution F , we denote by OP T (F ) the highest expected revenue over F attained by the optimal truthful mechanism (which, recall, is a posted-price mechanism).
Theorem 1 (See Theorem 3 and Corollary 1). There exists c > 1 /2 such that for every regular distribution F , we have ERM (F, 2) > c · OP T (F ). In particular, inf regular F
We note that to the best of our knowledge, Theorem 1 is in fact the first result to show that some deterministic mechanism constructed using two samples can guarantee more than one half of the optimal revenue for every regular distribution. 5 Proving Theorem 1 turns out to be a considerably more technically challenging than may have been expected (or rather, considerably more technically challenging than may have been expected before observing the negative answers to the above three problems, which may be seen as evidence that the proof of Theorem 1 should be challenging), up to the point that extending our methods even for comparing ERM for two and for three samples (let alone for higher values of n) seems intractable. The main problem that we leave open, therefore, is whether the monotonicity of ERM that is uncovered in Theorem 1 when going from a single sample to two samples, holds for any number of samples.
Open Problem 1. Is it true that inf regular F
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we formally present the model and definitions. In Section 3, we present the analysis of the above-surveyed negative results (to Problem 1, to Problem 2, and to an additional more technical problem). In Section 4, we present Theorem 1, which is our main result, and give a high-level overview of its proof. The proof itself is given in Sections 5 through 7, with some calculations relegated to the appendix.
Further Related Work
The literature on "mechanism design from samples" is preceded and inspired by the literature on prior-free and prior-independent mechanism design. Early work in Algorithmic Mechanism Design has mainly focused on prior-free mechanism design, aiming for either worst-case welfare approximation (e.g., Lehmann et al., 2002) or worst-case revenue approximation with respect to some instance-specific benchmark (e.g., the best revenue when selling at least 2 items (Goldberg et al., 2001) ). For more results on prior-free mechanisms see, for example, Chapter 7 of Hartline (2017) .
The standard economic model of revenue maximization assumes that the value of each player is drawn from a known prior distribution, and the seller aims to maximize her expected revenue for that prior (Myerson, 1981) . Bulow and Klemperer (1996) have presented a remarkable result, showing that a seller can attain at least his optimal revenue for buyers with values drawn i.i.d. from a regular distribution by using the VCG mechanism, as long as she can recruit one additional buyer (whose value is drawn independently from the same distribution). This mechanism is priorindependent in the sense that the mechanism does not depend on the priors, yet the approximation is obtained with respect to the optimal revenue for the specific distribution, even though this optimal revenue is unknown when the mechanism is run. Hartline and Roughgarden (2009) have initiated the systematic study of such prior-independent mechanisms. For more results on prior-independent mechanisms see, for example, Chapter 5 of Hartline (2017) .
A slightly less demanding model than the prior-independent model is the model in which the mechanism has access to samples from the unknown underlying distribution, with the benchmark still being the (unknown-to-the-mechanism) optimal revenue for that specific distribution. The current paper uses this model, and prior work in this model is surveyed in the introduction above.
A somewhat similar model where the auction is also chosen based on sampled data, which is studied in the learning literature, is an online-learning model where the mechanism designer can use information from prior auctions to on-line optimize the parameters of the next auction 5 We emphasize again, as mentioned above, that Fu et al. (2015) have constructed a randomized mechanism for one sample that guarantees more than one half of the optimal revenue in expectation. Our mechanism is thus the first deterministic mechanism constructed using two samples that guarantees more than one half of the optimal revenue. (Incidentally, our lower bound beats one half by orders of magnitude more than the lower bound of Fu et al. (2015) -see Section 4.) (Cesa-Bianchi et al., 2015; Weed et al., 2016) . The goal in this model is to optimize the overall performance.
The literature on "mechanism design from samples" restricts the dependence of the auction mechanism on the full details of the buyer's valuation distribution, by having it depend only on sample valuations drawn from this distribution. An alternative approach to restricting the dependence of the auction mechanism on the full details of the valuation distribution is by having it depend only on certain statistical measures of the valuation distribution, such as its mean, its variance, or its median .
Preliminaries

Model and Notation
Distributions and Revenues We consider one seller and one buyer. The seller has one good for sale, which has no value for the seller if it is left unsold. The buyer has a private value (valuation, i.e., maximum willingness to pay) for the good, which is drawn from some distribution F . For each real price p, the expected revenue attained from posting price p is thus simply p · Pr v∼F [v ≥ p] . The highest possible expected revenue attainable from any price is denoted by OPT(F ). The seller does not know the value of the buyer or the distribution F .
Empirical Revenue Maximization Given n samples from F , the empirical distribution over these n samples is simply the uniform distribution over the samples, i.e., sample i is drawn with probability 1 /n. The Empirical Revenue Maximization algorithm is given n independent samples from F , computes the price p that maximizes the expected revenue attained from the empirical distribution over the given n samples, and posts this price. We denote by ERM (F, n) the expected revenue of the price computed by the ERM algorithm over a fresh draw from F (independent from the n samples used to compute the price posted by the ERM algorithm); note that this revenue is in expectation over both the n samples and the fresh draw.
Quantile Space For our analysis, it would be convenient to reason about the possible values of the buyer using their quantiles. The quantile of a value v with respect to a distribution F is
. 6 (So the revenue from posting a price p is p · q(p).) Note that lower quantiles q correspond to higher valuations v. We also define the inverse map, from quantiles back to values: for a quantile q ∈ [0, 1], the value corresponding to that quantile with respect to a given atomless distribution F is denoted by v(q) = v F (q) (and is well defined since F is atomless). We note that sampling a value v ∼ F is therefore equivalent to uniformly sampling a quantile q ∈ [0, 1] and then taking the value corresponding to that quantile v = v(q).
Revenue Curve in Quantile Space
The revenue curve (in quantile space) that corresponds to an atomless value distribution F is the mapping r : [0, 1] → R + from a quantile q to the expected revenue r(q) = v(q) · q of posting the value v(q) as the price. We note that the value function v(·) (and hence also the distribution F ) can be recovered from the revenue curve via v(q) = r(q) q , that is, v(q) is precisely the slope of the line connecting the origin to the point (q, r(q)). We will at times write OPT(r) instead of OPT(F ), write v r instead of v F , etc. Note that OPT(r) = max q∈[0,1] r(q).
An atomless distribution F is called regular if its corresponding revenue curve (in quantile space) is concave. 7
Additional Notation
Definition 1 (e 2 ). Given a regular distribution F with revenue curve r, we define e 2 : [0, 1] 2 → R + , as follows.
Namely, given a pair of quantiles (q 1 , q 2 ), if the value max v(q 1 ), v(q 2 ) is at least twice as large as the value min v(q 1 ), v(q 2 ) then e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) is the expected revenue of the price max v(q 1 ), v(q 2 ) . Otherwise e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) is the expected revenue of the price min v(q 1 ), v(q 2 ) .
During our analysis, it will be useful to work with revenue curves r that are normalized so that OP T (r) = 1. The following simple lemma, whose proof is given in Appendix C for completeness, justifies that this is without loss of generality.
Lemma 1. For every regular distribution F with revenue curve r, and for every α > 0, we have
A Single Sample
In their paper, Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) show that a celebrated theorem by Bulow and Klemperer (1996) can be reinterpreted to imply that ERM guarantees one half of the optimal expected revenue for every regular distribution.
Theorem 2 (Dhangwatnotai et al., 2015) . ERM (F, 1) ≥ 1 2 OP T (F ) for every regular distribution F . Furthermore, this is tight, i.e., the constant 1 2 cannot be replaced with any larger constant in this statement. Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) also give a direct simple proof for Theorem 2 that does not use Bulow and Klemperer's result: recall that the quantile of a value drawn from F is distributed uniformly in [0, 1] . Therefore, the expected revenue by using a value drawn from F as a price is precisely the integral of the revenue curve r, i.e., the area under the curve r(·). Since this curve is convex, the area under it is at least half of the height of the highest point on this curve. (This bound is tight: fixing any triangular revenue curve, there exists a sequence of regular distributions whose revenue curves uniformly converge to this triangular curve. Thus, revenue curves with areas under them that are arbitrarily close to one half of the height of their highest point can be constructed.) Theorem 2 therefore follows since this height is precisely OP T (r) = OP T (F ).
As noted in the introduction, while the bound of one half from Theorem 2 cannot be improved upon by any deterministic mechanism, Fu et al. (2015) do manage to nonetheless construct, using one sample, a randomized pricing mechanism that guarantees a strictly higher revenue of (0.5 + 5 × 10 −9 ) · OP T (F ) > 1 2 · OP T (F ).
7 While the more popular definition of regularity (Myerson, 1981) is phrased using virtual values, these two standard definitions are known to be equivalent (in fact, the definition used here is more general as it also applies to nondifferentiable revenue curves). Indeed, it is well known that the derivative of the revenue curve at quantile q is Myerson's virtual value at v(q) , and so the definition of regularity as the virtual-value function being increasing corresponds to the derivative of the revenue curve being decreasing, i.e., to the revenue curve being convex.
Three Negative Results
In this section we present the analysis of the three negative results surveyed in the introduction. Proposition 1. There exists a regular distribution F such that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (F, 1).
Proof. The equal revenue distribution is the distribution supported on [1, ∞) with revenue 1 for every posted price, that is, the distribution G satisfying Pr v∼G [v ≥ p] = 1 /p for every p ≥ 1.
We take F to be the equal revenue distribution, truncated at v = 10 so that all of the mass of the equal revenue distribution G at values ≥ 10 is uniformly respread in F throughout a small interval [10, 10 + ε]. The corresponding revenue curve (in quantile space) r(q) = r F (q) climbs up almost linearly (with a very slight convex curvature, which tends to linear as ε grows small) from q = 0 (revenue 0) until q = 0.1 (revenue 1), and continues at revenue 1 from that point (i.e., for all quantiles q > 0.1). For simplicity, we will perform our calculations by approximating the slightly curved convex climb of r(q) in [0, 0.1] be a linear climb (conceptually corresponding to ε tending to zero), that is:
It is easy (and standard) to see that this approximation will have a negligible effect on our calculations of ERM (F, 2) and ERM (F, 1), as its effect, for any quantile q, on either r(q) or v(q) is negligible. For this to indeed hold, in the definition of e 2 when defining the quantile chosen by the arg min operator, we will henceforth break ties between q 1 , q 2 that have v(q 1 ) = v(q 2 ) (such distinct q 1 , q 2 can only occur in the initial linear climb of the revenue curve) in favor of larger quantiles (that is, higher revenue), as in the slightly curved initial convex climb of the revenue curve that is approximated by this linear climb, the value of a larger quantile is slightly smaller that that of a smaller quantile. We start by precisely calculating the expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM given one sample:
To calculate the expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM given two samples, we note that the revenue will be nonoptimal (i.e., less than 1) in precisely the following two cases:
• Both samples are from a quantile < 0.1. The expected revenue, conditioned on this case, is
• One sample is from a quantile q 1 < 0.1 and the other is from a quantile q 2 > 0.2 In this case, since v(q 1 ) ≥ 10 = 2 · 5 = 2 · v(0.2) > 2 · v(q 2 ), the price calculated by ERM given these two samples is v(q 1 ), and so the expected revenue, conditioned on this case,
Therefore, the expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM given two samples is:
And so, indeed, ERM (F, 2) = 11 /12 < 19 /20 = ERM (F, 1), as required.
Proposition 2. There exist regular distributions F and G such that ERM (F, 1) > ERM (G, 1) and ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2).
Proof. An intuitive strategy for proving Proposition 2 is as follows: recall from the proof of Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) of Theorem 2 that for distributions with "triangular" revenue curves, the expected revenue from posting a price computed by ERM given one sample, is precisely one half of optimal, since the area beneath the revenue curve is precisely one half of the maximum value of this curve. Nonetheless, when posting a price computed by ERM given two samples, it is not hard to observe that different triangular revenue curves result in different expected revenues. So, we will take F and G to be two distributions corresponding to triangular revenue curves with OP T (F ) = OP T (G), such that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2). Since both revenue curves are triangular, we have that ERM (F, 1) = ERM (G, 1). By slightly perturbing the revenue curve of F in a way that increases the area under this curve (causing ERM (F, 1) to increase) while only slightly changing ERM (F, 2), we obtain that for this perturbed F it still holds that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2), but at the same time it also holds that ERM (F, 1) > ERM (G, 1), as required. We omit the full details as Proposition 2 also follows from Proposition 3, whose more subtle proof we give below.
Recall from the proof of Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) for the single-sample case, that for any distribution F , the expected revenue ERM (F, 1) is the integral of the revenue curve r F (·) with respect to the uniform measure over quantiles. In the case of two samples, ERM (F, 2) can still be expressed as an appropriate integral of the revenue curse r F (·), with two main caveats: first, since two samples are involved, this integral is no longer with respect to the uniform measure on quantiles, and second, since the probability of using the price that corresponds to a certain quantile, i.e., the probability that ERM given two samples chooses this price, in fact depends in quite a delicate manner on the distribution F through the value function v F (·), the measure with respect to which this integral is defined is itself intricately dependent on the distribution F . To drive this point home, we present the following surprising observation: Proposition 3. There exist two regular distributions F and G with r F (q) > r G (q) for all 8 q ∈ (0, 1) (so r F (q) > r G (q) with respect to any measure), such that ERM (F, 2) < ERM (G, 2).
Proof of Proposition 3. We will choose distributions F and G for which OP T (F ) = OP T (G) = 1. We take G to be the distribution function corresponding to the "triangular" revenue curve r G (q) = q and take F to be the distribution function corresponding to the following "quadrilateral" revenue curve, which is obtained from r G by adding a slight "bump" (while maintaining convexity) at q = 0.1 (see Figure 1) :
We start with G (which corresponds to the uniform distribution over [1, 1 + ε] for negligible epsilon). By a simple calculation we have for one sample that ERM (G, 1) = 1 /2 and for two samples that ERM (G, 2) = E q 1 ,q 2 ∈U ([0,1]) max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) = 2 /3. We now move on to F ; the intuition behind our construction is that by adding the "bump" at 0.1, while we do increase revenue by 0 0.1 t ≈ 0.571 1 0 0.22 1 Figure 1 : The revenue curves r F (blue) and r G (green) corresponding to the distributions F and G from Proposition 3. The quantile t is the one that satisfies 2 · v F (t) = v F (0.22); that is, t is the q-coordinate of the intersection point of r F and the ray from (0, 0) with slope exactly half that of the ray from (0, 0) to (0.1, 0.22).
slightly raising max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) above 2 /3, we in fact decrease the revenue by "confusing" the ERM algorithm and causing it to choose the higher price of the two samples, which corresponds to the lower revenue min r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) , in some cases, such as whenever the quantile of one of the samples is below 0.1 and the quantile of the other is above t ≈ 0.571 (since in this case v min{q 1 , q 2 } > 2 · v max{q 1 , q 2 } ). As it turns out, the latter effect dominates the former one, causing an overall decrease in expected revenue compared to that of F . In Appendix A.1, we calculate and show that indeed ERM (F, 2) < 0.651 < ERM (G, 2), thereby completing the proof.
Main Result
In this section, we phrase and prove our main result.
Theorem 3. For every regular distribution F , we have that ERM (F, 2) > 0.509 · OPT(F ).
Theorem 3 is the first part of Theorem 1 from the introduction. Combining Theorem 3 with Theorem 2, we obtain our main monotonicity result (the second part of Theorem 1 from the introduction).
As noted in the introduction, proving Theorem 3 turns out to be considerably more technically challenging than may have been expected. One hint as to why was already given in Proposition 3. To prove Theorem 3, we lower-bound the integral that defines ERM (F, 2) by estimating it over three domains: first, we estimate this integral conditioned upon the two samples corresponding to prices lower than the ideal posted price; second, we estimate this integral condition upon the two samples corresponding to prices higher than the ideal posted price; and finally, we estimate this integral conditioned upon the two samples falling on opposite sides of the ideal posted price. Estimating each of these integrals is quite involved. For the first two domains, we manage to show that ERM guarantees quantifiably more than one half of the optimal revenue, while unfortunately for the third domain, we do not manage to show that ERM guarantees even half of the optimal revenue, forcing us to estimate the integral for the first two domains tightly enough to enable us to argue that the losses in this third domain could be charged to the gains in the first two domains. To balance the charging argument, we must utilize quite a few observations in each domain, and furthermore estimate the integral in the first and last domains functions of the quantile of the ideal price. Putting all of these together, we manage to show an overall guarantee of at least 0.509 of OP T (F ) -quite close to one half, but nonetheless strictly bounded away from one half (and still greater by orders of magnitude than the guarantee of (0.5 + 5 × 10 −9 ) · OP T (F ) that Fu et al. (2015) show for their randomized mechanism for one sample).
One possible way to approach Theorem 3 (and more generally, Open Problem 1) could have been to try and identify the worst-case distributions for 2 samples (and more generally, for n samples), i.e., distributions F for which
OPT(F ) (and more generally,
OPT(F ) ) is smallest, and then to calculate this fraction for such distributions F . Indeed, recall that this is how Dhangwatnotai et al. (2015) have proved Theorem 2: they have identified the distributions with triangular revenue curves as the worst-case distributions for one sample, and showed that for these distributions this fraction equals one half. Unfortunately, following this path, even for two samples, turns out quite elusive. In this vain, hoping that some distribution with a triangular revenue curve continues to be a worst-case distribution, Huang, Mansour, and Roughgarden (personal communication, 2015) have identified the single distribution with triangular revenue curve for which this fraction is smallest among all distributions with triangular revenue curves, and have calculated this fraction for this distribution (incidentally, it turns out to be considerably higher than our lower bound from Theorem 3). Unfortunately, in light of our proof of Proposition 3, it seems that one can show that for some distribution with a quadrilateral revenue curve (created, similarly to the proof of Proposition 3, by adding a small "bump" to the "left edge" of the triangular revenue curve identified by Huang, Mansour, and Roughgarden), this fraction turns out to be smaller than for the distribution identified by Huang, Mansour, and Roughgarden, and hence we conclude that no distribution with a triangular revenue curve is a worst-case distribution for ERM for two samples. As we do not know how to identify the worst-case distributions for ERM, even for two samples, our analysis must bound the fraction ERM (F,2) OPT(F ) for arbitrary regular distributions. In the remainder of this section, we survey the high-level ideas behind the proof of Theorem 3, whose full proof is given in Sections 5 through 7, with some calculations relegated to Appendix A. Formally, we partition the set of pairs of quantiles as follows:
Definition 2 (L; R; B). For a regular distribution F with revenue curve r, we define 10 q * arg max q∈[0,1] r(q) and partition [0, 1] 2 into three sets:
To prove Theorem 3, we will lower-bound the expected revenue of a price chosen by the ERM algorithm given two samples, conditioned upon these two samples belonging to each of the sets R, L, and B.
10 In case of multiple revenue-maximizing quantiles, we may pick q * arbitrarily among them.
Figure 2: Pictorial definition of t(q) from the proof of Lemma 2. When r is continuous with r(1) = 0, then t(q) is the q-coordinate of the intersection point of r and the ray from (0, 0) with slope exactly half that of the ray from (0, 0) to q, r(q) .
Both Samples Below the Ideal Price (R)
In Section 5, we lower-bound the expected revenue, conditioned upon both samples being lower than the ideal price q * :
Lemma 2. For every regular F ,
As noted above, it would not have sufficed to simply bound the expectation on the left-hand side of the above inequality away from one half of OPT, as we will have to charge the losses below one-half-of-OPT of our lower bound for the case where the quantiles are in B (given in Lemma 4 below), which depend on q * , to the gains above one-half-of-OPT from Lemma 2 (and from Lemma 3 below). To prove Lemma 2, we first lower-bound, for each possible quantile q, the expected revenue of the price computed by ERM conditioned upon min{q 1 , q 2 } = q. Recall that since both quantiles are in R, we have that q is the quantile of the "better" sample, with higher expected revenue. Denoting by t(q) the threshold value of max{q 1 , q 2 } (see Figure 2 ) so that the ERM algorithm chooses the price that corresponds to quantile q (the price that attains better expected revenue among the two samples), it turns out that we are in a win-win situation: if t(q) is "close" to q, then conditioned upon min{q 1 , q 2 } = q, there is a high probability that the higher quantile lies above t(q), causing the "better" sample (with quantile q) to be chosen; conversely, the farther t(q) is from q, the larger r t(q) is, i.e., the revenue curve r decreases quite moderately between q * and t(q), and so even when the "worse" sample is chosen, the revenue is still reasonably high. The full proof of Lemma 2 is given in Section 5, with some calculations relegated to Appendix A.2.
Both Samples Above the Ideal Price (L)
In Section 6, we lower-bound the expected revenue, conditioned upon both samples being higher than the ideal price q * :
Lemma 3. For every regular F ,
To survey the proof of Lemma 3, we define:
, r(q 2 ) -the expected revenue had we always picked the "better" sample (the sample with higher expected revenue).
The proof of Lemma 3 is based on a coupling of E L 2 and M L 2 , giving that
, with equality if and only if r is constant 11 .
The proof of this inequality is similar to the proof of Lemma 2, and is achieved by lower-bounding, for each possible quantile q, the expected revenue of the price computed by ERM conditioned upon max{q 1 , q 2 } = q. Recall that since both quantiles are in L, we have that q is the quantile of the "better" sample, with higher expected revenue. Denoting by t(q) the threshold value of min{q 1 , q 2 } (see Figure 3 ) so that the ERM algorithm chooses the price that corresponds to quantile q (the price that attains better expected revenue among the two samples), we show that we are once again in a win-win situation: if t(q) is "close" to q, then conditioned upon max{q 1 , q 2 } = q, there is a high probability that the lower quantile lies below t(q), causing the "better" sample (with quantile q) to be chosen; conversely, the farther t(q) is from q, the larger r t(q) is, i.e., the revenue curve r decreases quite moderately between q * and t(q), and so even when the "worse" sample is chosen, the revenue is still reasonably close to that of the "better" sample. Unlike in the proof of Lemma 2, the proof of Lemma 3 requires some additional case-analysis beyond this point. A simple calculation shows that The observations in the two "bullets" above lead to the following win-win situation:
• Either r is "far from linear", and then
• or r is "far from constant", and then
The full proof of Lemma 3 is given in Section 6, with some calculations relegated to Appendix A.3.
11 That is, ∀q : r(q) = OPT(r). 12 That is, ∃m > 0, so that ∀q : r(q) = m · q.
Figure 3: Pictorial definition of t from the proof of Lemma 3. t(q) is the q-coordinate of the rightmost intersection point of r and the ray from (0, 0) with slope exactly twice that of the ray from (0, 0) to q, r(q) .
One Sample on Each Side of the Ideal Price (B)
In Section 7, we lower-bound the expected revenue, conditioned upon one of the two samples being lower than the ideal price q * and the other being higher than the ideal price q * :
Lemma 4. For every regular F ,
As already mentioned above, whenever q * > 0, the right-hand side of the above inequality (which deteriorates as q * grows) is strictly less than the one-half-of-OPT(F ) guarantee of ERM given one sample, so when proving Theorem 3 we will have to charge this loss to the gains over one-half-of-OPT(F ) that we obtained in the lower bounds of Lemmas 2 and 3. The correctness of Lemma 4 follows from the following sublemma. 
(a) Pictorial definition of T from the proof of Lemma 4. When r is continuous with r(1) = 0, then T (x) is the y-coordinate of the intersection point of r and the ray from (0, 0) with slope exactly half that of the ray from (0, 0) to x · q * , r(x · q * ) . The proof of Sublemma 4 is given in Section 7. We will now show how Lemma 4 indeed follows from this sublemma.
Proof of Lemma 4. By Lemma 1, we may assume without loss of generality that OPT(r) = 1. By symmetry of e 2 , it is enough to prove the claim w.r.t. (q 1 , q 2 ) ∼ B 1 , where B 1 {(q 1 , q 2 ) ∈ B | q 1 < q 2 }. We define: Figure 4(a) .)
We notice that under these definitions, we have (where G(x, y) is defined as in Sublemma 4) that
We note that the lower-bound that we obtain by applying Sublemma 4, as is, to the above definitions of r 1 , r 2 , T , is 3 /8, which for q * < 1 is worse than the guarantee that we are attempting to prove in Lemma 4. The main idea that drives our improved revenue guarantee in Lemma 4 is to bound m, the minimum value attained by T , away from 0. Since the intersection of y = x 2q * (the line defined by the points (0, 0) and (q * , 1 /2)) and y = 1 − x−q * 1−q * (the line defined by the points (q * , 1) and (1, 0)) is ( Applying Sublemma 4 with this value of m, we obtain that
as required. The calculation justifying the last equality is detailed in Appendix A.4.
Completing the Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 follows from combining Lemmas 2 through 4.
Proof of Theorem 3. By definition,
In Appendix A.5, we substitute the respective lower bounds from Lemmas 2 through 4 for each of the above summands, and calculate and show that indeed ERM (F, 2) > 0.509 · OPT(F ), thereby completing the proof of Theorem 3.
Both Samples Below the Ideal Price (R): Proof of Lemma 2
Proof of Lemma 2. By Lemma 1, we may assume without loss of generality that OPT(r) = 1. We define:
The random variable min{q 1 , q 2 } has density function µ(q) = 2
Note that
Let q ∈ [0, 1]. Conditioned 13 on min{q 1 , q 2 } = q, we have that e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) is equal to r(q) = max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) exactly when 2v max{q 1 , q 2 } ≤ v(q). Thus, we define t(q) as the threshold value that determines when e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) = r(q) = max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) .
Definition 3 (t(x); see Figure 2 on Page 11). For q ∈ [q * , 1], we define
For q = 1, define t(1) 1, and when q * = 0, define t(0) 0.
It is not hard to verify the following properties of the function t(q).
Sublemma 5 (Properties of t).
1. e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) = max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) if and only if max{q 1 , q 2 } ≥ t min{q 1 , q 2 } .
2. For all q: t(q) ∈ [q, 2q] (due to monotonicity of r).
t is monotone nondecreasing (due to monotonicity of v).
t is continuous (due to continuity of r).
v(t(q)) = v(q)
2 , whenever t(q) = 0. The following lemma relates E R 2 (r|q) with r(q), which is the expected revenue obtained by always choosing the "better" sample when min{q 1 , q 2 } = q.
Sublemma 6. For all q:
Proof. Conditioned on min{q 1 , q 2 } = q, the random variable x max{q 1 , q 2 } is distributed uniformly in [q, 1]. Thus,
Sublemma 7. For every q ∈ [0, 1]:
Proof. By Sublemma 6,
Where P q (x)
2 is a quadratic polynomial with minimum at x min 3 2 q. Since t(q) ≤ 1, it follows that 
, and
With Sublemma 7 in hand, we are ready to finish the proof of Lemma 2. We will use the following simple fact that follows from the concavity of r:
indeed, (q) = 1−q 1−q * is an affine function satisfying (q * ) = 1 = r(q * ), and (1) = 0 ≤ r(1). In Appendix A.2, we use Sublemma 7 and Equation (1) to calculate and show that indeed E R 2 (r) is lower-bounded as in the statement of Lemma 2, thereby completing the proof of this lemma.
Both Samples Above the Ideal Price (L): Proof of Lemma 3
Proof of Lemma 3. When proving Lemma 2, we had no choice but to carry on the dependence on q * throughout the proof. Luckily, in the case where both samples are above the ideal price, we may normalize q * to equal 1 without loss of generality. Indeed, the resulting distribution has all values multiplied by q * (similarly to the proof of Lemma 1), and so the choice of ERM between the values corresponding to any two quantiles is unchanged. Furthermore, as before, by Lemma 1 we may assume without loss of generality that OPT(r) = 1.
We begin by coupling
Conditioned on max{q 1 , q 2 } = q, 14 we have that e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) is equal to r(q) = max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) exactly when v min{q 1 , q 2 } < 2v(q). Thus, we define t(q) as the threshold value that determines when e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) = r(q) = max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) .
Definition 4 (t(x); see Figure 3 on Page 13). For q ∈ [0, 1], we define
It is not hard to verify the following properties of the function t(q).
Sublemma 8 (Properties of t).
1. e 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) = max r(q 1 ), r(q 2 ) if and only if min{q 1 , q 2 } ≥ t max{q 1 , q 2 } .
2. For all q: t(q) ≤ q 2 (due to monotonicity of r).
t is monotone nondecreasing (due to monotonicity of v).
t is continuous (due to continuity of r).
5. v(t(q)) = 2v(q), whenever t(q) = 0.
The following sublemma relates M L 2 (r|q) and E L 2 (r|q).
Sublemma 9. For all q:
Proof. Conditioned on max{q 1 , q 2 } = q, the random variable
(by concavity, ∀x ≤ t :
(by Sublemma 8(5), ∀q :
Since for every y the value of the polynomial y 2 − y + 1 is at least 3 4 , we obtain the following sublemma:
We next quantify the distinction between revenue curves r that are "close" to constant, and revenue curves r that are "close" to linear. To this end, fix some δ ∈ [0, 1] that we will later pick in a way that maximizes the revenue. We distinguish between two types of revenue curves r: 15 1. r satisfies r( 1 /2) ≥ (1 + δ) · 1 /2 (r is "far" from linear).
2. r satisfies r( 1 /2) < (1 + δ) · 1 /2 (r is "far" from constant).
Sublemma 11 (The Case in which r is "Far from Linear"). If r satisfies r( 1 /2)
Proof. Let 1 (q) be the affine function that satisfies 1 (0) = 0 and 1 ( 1 /2) = (1 + δ) · 1 /2, and let
(by linearity of expectation)
(by Lemma 6(2,3) in Appendix B)
Combining Sublemmas 10 and 11 yields:
Sublemma 13 (The Case in which r is "Far from Constant"). If r satisfies r( 1 /2) < (1 Proof. We first show that ∀q : t(q) ≤ min{ q /2, γ}.
That t(q) ≤ q 2 follows from Sublemma 8(2). To see that t(q) ≤ γ for all q, it suffices to show that t(1) ≤ γ (since t(q) is monotone nondecreasing by Sublemma 8(3)). Since r(1) = 1, we have v(1) = 1, and so by Sublemma 8(5), t(1) is the q-coordinate of the intersection point of the line y = 2q and r(q). Let (q) be the affine function that satisfies ( 1 /2) = (1 + δ) · 1 /2 and (1) = 1. By concavity of r, for all q ∈ [0, 1 /2], r(q) ≤ (q). Therefore, since by Sublemma 8(2), t(1) ≤ 1 /2, it follows that t(1) is at most the q-coordinate of the intersection point of the lines y = 2q, and (q). A simple calculation shows that the latter q-coordinate is δ 1+δ = γ, and so t(1) ≤ γ. (See Figure 5. ) Therefore, we have shown that ∀q : t(q) ≤ min{ q /2, γ}, as required.
Figure 5: Pictorial definition of γ from Sublemma 13. The assumption that r( 1 /2) < (1 + δ) · 1 /2 implies that the graph of r restricted to [0, 1 /2] must be completely contained in the shaded region. γ is the largest possible value of t(1) (which is attained when r is the largest possible within the shaded region).
Therefore, by Sublemma 9,
≥ E q t q 2 − t q + 1 · q (by concavity and since r(1) = 1, ∀q : r(q) ≥ q)
(since when q > 2γ, we have which concludes the proof of Lemma 3.
One Sample on Each Side of the Ideal Price (B): Proof of Lemma 4
We complete the proof of Lemma 4 by proving Sublemma 4, from which we have shown above that Lemma 4 follows.
To prove Equation (3), for every
. We note that since M (x) is increasing in T (x), we have that M (x) ≥M . We now fix x ∈ [0, 1]. By definition and since M (x) ≥M , we have that
For the first part of Equation (3), note that if r 1 (x) ≤M , then
For the second part of Equation (3), note that if r 1 (x) >M , then for any convex combination of r 1 (x) andM , increasing the relative weight ofM can only reduce the total value of the convex combination. Therefore,
concluding the proof of Equation (3).
Let p 1 Pr x∼U ([0,1]) r 1 (x) ≤M . By Equation (3), we have that
where the last inequality is by monotonicity and concavity of r 1 and since r 1 (1) = 1. SinceM ≤ 1, we have thatM ≤ 1+M 2 . By concavity of r 1 and since r 1 (1) = 1, we note that p 1 ≤M . By both of these and by Equation (4), we have that
Finally, by monotonicity and concavity of r 2 and since since r 2 (1) = 1, we have thatM ≥ 1+m 2 . Noting that the function z − z 2 /2 is increasing in [0, 1], we therefore have that
as required. (1 − q * ) n n − (1 − q * ) 2 2 − (1 − q * ) = 1 3 − 1 4(1 − q * ) − 1 2(1 − q * ) 2 − log q * 2(1 − q * ) 3 . Now consider the case in which q * < 2 /3. 
(by Equation (1) The derivative of the above is negative for q * ∈ [0, 2 /3], and since at q * = 2 /3 it coincides with the lower-bound from Equation (5), we therefore have that ERM (F, 2) > 0.509, regardless of the value of q * .
B Auxiliary Technical Results used in Sections 5 and 6
Lemma 5 Lemma 6 (Properties of max{q 1 , q 2 }). Let (q 1 , q 2 ) ∼ U [0, 1] 2 . The random variable max{q 1 , q 2 } is a random variable attaining values in [0, 1] with the following properties:
1. Its Cumulative Distribution Function is Pr [max{q 1 , q 2 } ≤ q] = q 2 , and its Probability Density Function is µ(q) = 2q.
2. For every q ∈ [0, 1], E q 1 ,q 2 max{q 1 , q 2 } max{q 1 , q 2 } ≤ q = 2 3 q.
3. For every q ∈ [0, 1], E q 1 ,q 2 max{q 1 , q 2 } max{q 1 , q 2 } ≥ q = v α·r (q) = α · r(q) q = α · r(q) q = α · v r (q).
For Part 2, let q 1 , q 2 ∈ [0, 1]. By Part 1, max v α·r (q 1 ), v α·r (q 2 ) ≥ 2 min v α·r (q 1 ), v α·r (q 2 ) if and only if max v r (q 1 ), v r (q 2 ) ≥ 2 min v r (q 1 ), v r (q 2 ) . We first consider the case where both of these conditions hold. In this case, by Part 1, e α·r 2 (q 1 , q 2 ) = α · r arg max q∈{q 1 ,q 2 } v α·r (q) = α · r arg max q∈{q 1 ,q 2 } v r (q) = α · e r 2 (q 1 , a 2 ).
The case in which neither of these conditions holds is handled similarly, replacing arg max with arg min.
